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Summary
In the present paper we examine the impact of firms’ attitudes towards key aspects of the recruitment
process on the number of search channels activated. Furthermore, we address the issue of the timing
of the activation of additional search channels. It is found that firms that attach importance to search
effort and to applicants’ motivation generally use more search channels than firms that do not attach
any importance to the aforementioned aspects of recruitment. Furthermore, it appears that employers
generally use fewer search channels for permanent positions. However, firms with a personnel depart-
ment which are hiring for a vacancy requiring specific work experience usually activate multiple
search channels. Finally, the choice of advertising as the first search channel appears to negatively
affect the chances of considering additional channels.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Employers invest a considerable amount of time and resources in the search for
new employees. It requires much effort to identify and attract the applicants with
the desired characteristics. Search and selection time spells may lead to the ex-
istence of a costly unfilled vacancy within a firm.
In the employers’ search literature, most of the studies have considered issues
related to vacancy duration1 and the strategies firms may adopt in order to mini-
mize this. In particular, this strand of literature has focussed on the use of search
channels, sometimes in conjunction with the analysis of vacancy duration ~Roper
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~1988!, Lindeboom ~1992!, van Ours and Ridder ~1992!, Gorter et al. ~1996!, and
Russo et al. ~1997a!!.
It has also been recognized that the choice of the search channels is of stra-
tegic importance in most staffing programmes; it may affect both the number of
potential applicants and their expected productivity ~and hence the value of the
match between the vacant position and the eligible job seeker ~Boudreau and
Rynes ~1985!, Montgomery ~1991!!. However, only few studies have related the
use of search channels to the characteristics of the hired applicant ~Russo et al.
~1997b!, Holzer ~1996!!, or have investigated the role of personnel management
in recruitment ~Holzer ~1987! and Russo et al. ~1997a!!.
In the present empirical analysis our aim is to further characterize the role of
firms’ attitudes in recruitment. To this end, we use an economic model based on
sequential search that relates the choice of a certain strategy ~in our case the num-
ber of search channels activated! to firms’ attitudes towards some key aspects of
the recruitment process. This is an important element in our empirical analysis;
this new topic has received relatively little attention in the literature thus far.
Basically, there are two economic reasons that may induce employers to acti-
vate more search channels. First, employers may want to screen at least a certain
number of candidates before making an employment offer ~search at the exten-
sive margin as described in Barron et al. ~1985!, Barron and Bishop ~1985!, and
Barron et al. ~1997!!. In the case employers expect that none of the search chan-
nels alone will be able to provide the desired number of applicants2 more search
channels will be activated ~quantity effect!. Second, employers may prefer to
screen different types of applicants ~with different characteristics! before making
an employment offer. In the event that search channels reach applicants with dif-
ferent characteristics ~Kirnan et al. ~1989!!, employers may be keen on using more
search channels to trigger applications from different types of job seekers ~quality
effect!.
Of course, the likelihood that an employer wants to screen more or more types
of applicants is heavily influenced by his/her attitude towards recruitment ~Holzer
~1987!!. In fact, employers may have different attitudes towards the importance
of certain aspects of recruitment such as the quality of the applicants, the cost of
the recruitment procedure, the time spent recruiting, the compliance with the hir-
ing standards, and last but not least, the level of effort to put into recruitment. In
particular, employers with a higher propensity to put effort into recruitment may
be willing to screen more applicants and to activate more search channels before
making an employment offer. In the same vein, employers attaching more impor-
tance to applicants’ motivation may be willing to screen more applicants and ac-
tivate more search channels before making an employment offer. On the other
hand, those employers wanting to fill the vacancy quickly or those unwilling to
invest in the recruitment process may be less choosy about the quality ~or quan-
2 The relevant segment in the labour market could be particularly tight.
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tity! of the applicants. Consequently, these employers will probably activate fewer
recruitment channels.
After these introductory remarks, we will introduce the employers’ search
model in section 2. This is followed by a description of the available data set in
section 3. In section 4 the analytical tools are presented; a censored regression
model and a Poisson model for the number of search channels to be activated.
Section 5 will present the main results, whereas section 6 will offer some con-
cluding remarks.
2 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To find the right worker for a position within an organization is a lengthy pro-
cedure. From a demand side perspective the presence of vacancies implicitly sig-
nals the presence of uncertainty in recruitment. Employers are faced with uncer-
tainty because they have imperfect information on the availability of job seekers
and their associated productivity. To reduce the degree of uncertainty, employers
may decide to put more effort into their search activity and to use screening and
selection procedures to gather reliable information about applicants’ productivity
~search at the intensive margin, see Barron et al. ~1985! and Barron and Bishop
~1985!!.
In what follows, firms are assumed to maximize profits by choosing their op-
timal search strategy on a per period basis ~following customary dynamic opti-
mization behaviour as outlined in Lippman and McCall ~1976!!.
Each period, applicants are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process
at a rate ~known to the firm! that depends on the total number of job seekers and
the total number of open vacancies. Conditional upon arrival, every applicant is a
random draw from a known probability distribution. The applicant’s productivity
is not directly observable but it can be approximated by easily observable char-
acteristics like educational level, years of experience, and the worker’s age. Dur-
ing the search activity employers may be able to influence the rate of arrival of
applicants3 by varying the number of search channels used. Search channels reach
different populations of job seekers ~Kirnan et al. ~1989!! and can be character-
ized by different rates of arrival of applicants ~Russo et al. ~1995!!. Employers
activate a search channel by allocating search effort to it and by paying the as-
sociated cost. The optimal number of search channels activated is given by the
condition that the marginal cost from opening an additional search channel is
3 In what follows we will assume sequential search. It has been argued that during recruitment
employers may actually be using non-sequential search strategies ~van Ours and Ridder ~1991!, van
Ours and Ridder ~1992!, van Ours and Ridder ~1993!, and Gorter and van Ommeren ~1999!!. Van
Ours and Ridder ~1993! find an average application period of 3.1 weeks and a mean selection period
of 14.6 weeks. However, the average duration in our data set is 5.5 weeks and the median duration is
4 weeks only. Short vacancy duration suggests that employers are less likely to have used non-se-
quential search.
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equal to the marginal benefits, which are determined by the product of the mar-
ginal increment in the applicants’ arrival rate due to the activation of one addi-
tional search channel times the average acceptance probability. If search costs are
equal across channels, employers will activate search channels in such a way as
to equate the marginal benefits from search across search channels.
Of course, firms’ attitude towards recruitment will also play a role. Firms that
regard effort as an important aspect in recruitment may be willing to invest rela-
tively more in the search activity and to activate more search channels. Firms
that deem the speed in providing applicants as important would tend to activate
those search channels characterized by a high rate of arrival of applicants, re-
gardless of the type of applicant these search channels reach. Again, cost-sensi-
tive employers would rather make use of less expensive search channels. Further-
more, those firms that consider it important to approach only the right applicants
would then select those search channels that best reach the selected target popu-
lation of job seekers.
Employers maximize the expected present value of the flow of profits in a
stationary environment, the optimal search strategy can be characterized by a con-
stant reservation level of productivity4 ~Fallick ~1992!! and by an optimal num-
ber of search channels to be activated ~per period, denoted by sc!. Employers
will then hire the first applicant whose productivity is higher than the reservation
level of productivity.
The optimal choice of the number of search channels to activate and of the
reservation productivity ~to be made each period! jointly determines the likeli-
hood that an applicant is hired for the position concerned5 ~the hazard rate, Lan-
caster ~1992!!. The probability of filling a vacancy ~u! can be written as follows:
u 5 m ~sc!p ~j! , ~1!
where m is the rate of arrival of job seekers, which is a function of the search
channels activated in the period ~sc!, and p is the acceptance probability, which
depends on the reservation productivity ~j!.
To summarize, each period firms choose the optimal reservation level of pro-
ductivity and set the optimal number of search channels. This process determines
the probability to fill vacancy. In turn, this determines the total vacancy duration
~T!. At the end of the recruitment process the firm would have activated SC ~T!
different search channels.6
4 Van Ours and Ridder ~1991! find that educational requirements are not lowered as the vacancy
duration lengthens. This result is compatible with a constant reservation level of productivity.
5 In this partial equilibrium approach, it is usually assumed that the applicants reacting to a vacancy
notification are also willing to accept the job if an offer is tendered.
6 We implicitly assume that once a search channel has been activated it remains active for the rest
of the recruitment process.
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Of course, both the number of search channels activated ~SC~T!!, and the res-
ervation productivity ~j! vary across firms and across types of jobs ~heteroge-
neous firms and jobs!.
In this framework employers choose their recruitment methods ~which and how
many search channels to use! at the beginning of the recruitment procedure; if
the vacancy is not filled by the end of the period, next period recruitment begins
again with the same optimal search strategy. Employers may choose a different
search strategy if, for example, some of the structural parameters change. To al-
low for a switch to an alternative search strategy, the model needs either a learn-
ing process ~the introduction of learning in a job search model and the conditions
under which this learning process leads to a decreasing reservation wage are
stated in Burdett and Vishwanath ~1988!! or the introduction of non-stationarity
in the structural parameters ~the rate of arrival is then time-dependent due to
source exhaustion, as shown for job search models in van den Berg ~1990!.7
The model as specified here is very general; employers may activate one search
channel at the time, more search channels simultaneously, or use a package of
more search channels sequentially ~one package after the other!8; the actual tim-
ing would depend on the characteristics of the search channels involved ~see
Gorter and van Ommeren ~1999!!.
In our empirical application, we use data on filled vacancies ~completed spells
of duration!. For each filled vacancy we know: ~i! the total number of ~different!
search channels used during the recruitment period ~SC ~T!! and ~ii! background
vacancy and firm characteristics. These two sets of variables will support the em-
pirical part of this paper.
3 THE DATA SET
Our data set originates from as survey on employers’ recruitment behaviour held
in 1986 in the Netherlands and consists of 763 filled vacancies9 ~745 after cor-
recting for missing data and wrong or impossible answers!. In the survey, firms
were asked about their recruitment behaviour with reference to their last vacancy
filled. The survey contains information on firms’ recruitment behaviour, such as:
the first recruitment channel used, the number of recruitment channels activated,
the actual hiring channel10, and the vacancy duration, together with vacancy char-
acteristics ~educational level required, experience required! and firm characteris-
7 The implementation of a theoretical non-stationary search model describing the timing in the ac-
tivation of recruitment channels ~as in Gorter and van Ommeren ~1990!! is beyond the scope of this
paper.
8 The functioning of different recruitment channels has been thoroughly investigated in Gorter et al.
~1996! and Gorter and van Ommeren ~1999!. Van Ours ~1994! paid special attention to the function-
ing of the labour exchange office.
9 The survey represents a flow sample of filled vacancies, see Lancaster ~1992!.
10 The hiring channel is the search channel that produced the hired applicant.
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tics ~such as size, economic sector, personnel department, etc.!. Moreover, firms
were asket about the importance of certain key aspects of recruitment ~such as
costs, generating motivated applicants, generating the right applicants, speed in
providing applicants, and the effort!. Further information on the definition of the
firms’ attitudes towards recruitment variables can be found in Appendix A1.11
The survey contains extensive information on the use of search channels; in
particular the first search channel activated and the search channel that in the end
became the hiring channel are reported. In the sample the average number of
channels activated is 1.84 ~51% of the firms in the sample activated only one
search channel!. Table 1 offers relevant descriptive statistical information on the
use of search channels. The data set distinguishes between 11 different channels;
but, for the sake of convenience, we have clustered the search channels into five
11 Moreover, the list of variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in Appendix A2. The
associated descriptive statistics are given in Appendix A3.
TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE ACTIVATION OF SEARCH CHANNELS
Frequency Percentage Average
duration
Average number
of channels
First channel activated
Informal 294 39.5 5.2 2.0
Advertisement 251 33.7 6.1 1.5
Labour exchange office 130 17.6 5.1 2.2
Temporary placement office 28 3.6 5.7 2.1
Others 42 5.6 7.6 2.1
Total 745 100.0 5.6 1.8
First channel
Number of
channels
activated
Frequency Percentage Average
duration
~in weeks!
Informal Advert. LEO TPO Others
1 380 51.0 4.9 127 168 54 14 21
2 193 25.9 6.2 90 55 33 4 6
3 106 14.2 6.5 48 21 25 6 7
4 37 5.1 7.5 18 3 8 3 5
5 29 3.8 6.3 11 4 10 1 3
Total 745 100.0 5.6
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groups: Informal channel,12 Advertisement, Labour Exchange Office ~LEO!, Tem-
porary Placement Office ~TPO!, and the residual category Others. The first part
of Table 1 provides some useful information on the way recruitment channels
operate. It appears that the informal channel, LEO and TPO tend to behave in a
similar way; they involve an average duration of about 5 weeks and the average
number of recruitment channels used is around 2. The only channel that seems to
show a different behaviour is advertisement; in this case the average duration is
somewhat longer, 6 weeks, whilst the average number of search channels acti-
vated is lower ~1.5!. Notice that as the number of search channels activated in-
creases the duration of the recruitment process increases as well. In other words,
longer recruitment processes tend to be associated with the use of more search
channels ~in fact, the correlation coefficient r 5 0.12 is significant at 5%!.
Another interesting aspect regards the effectiveness of search channels in fill-
ing vacancies; that is, the number of times recruitment channel activated also be-
comes the hiring channel. The statistics about the effectiveness of search chan-
nels are put together in Table 2.
It can be seen that, in line with the results in the literature ~Lindeboom ~1992!,
Gorter et al. ~1993!, Russo et al. ~1997a!!, there are striking differences among
recruitment channels with advertising being the most effective ~in 91% of the
cases advertisement is activated as the first search channel and it also becomes
the hiring channel! and LEO being the least effective.13 Advertisement’s high ef-
fectiveness may arise from the fact that advertising is a search channel that is
often used in isolation. The lower panel of Table 2 shows that advertisement re-
mains the most effective search channel in filling vacancies also when more
search channels are activated. These differences in the search channels’ perform-
ance strongly suggest that it may also be appropriate to estimate the empirical
model controlling for employers’ initial choice of the recruitment channel.
Firms’ attitudes towards certain aspects of recruitment may disclose firms’ pro-
pensity to search actively in the recruitment process. In particular, firms consid-
ering effort an important aspect of recruitment may search more actively for can-
didates.
Table 3 summarizes the relationship between firms’ attributes towards recruit-
ment and the duration of the recruitment process and the number and type of
search channels activated. Clearly, firms that consider effort an important aspect
of recruitment ~effort 5 1! tend to activate more search channels and tend to
search longer than firms that do not. On the contrary, the frequency of activation
of the first search channel does not seem to differ from what happens in the whole
12 It includes the use of friends and relatives, the use of incumbent workers, and the use of open
applications ~Rees ~1966!!.
13 It is important to point out that Lindeboom ~1992! found that advertisement and informal chan-
nels are most effective in matching employed job seekers, while LEO is the worst in this respect. The
conclusion may change when an unemployed job seeker has to be matched. In this case, the most
effective channel turns out to be LEO.
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population ~Informal: 39%, Advertisement: 35%, LEO: 17%, TPO: 3.3%, Others:
5.7%!.
The same result holds true for those firms considering applicants of good qual-
ity an important aspect of the recruitment process. Firms that consider low costs
as an important characteristic of the recruitment process ~Cost 5 0! however, tend
to rely more on the use of informal search channels and less on the use of ad-
TABLE 2 – CHANNELS’ EFFECTIVENESS IN MATCHING VACANCIES AND JOB SEEKERS
The whole sample
First channel Hiring channel
Informal Advertisement LEO TPO Others Total
Informal 190 76 20 4 4 294
65.0 25.7 6.5 1.4 1.4 39.5
Advertisement 17 228 2 2 2 251
6.8 90.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 33.7
LEO 16 32 74 7 2 130
11.5 24.6 57.0 5.4 1.5 17.4
TPO 1 5 – 22 – 28
3.7 18.5 – 77.8 – 3.8
Others 5 6 1 1 29 42
11.9 14.3 2.4 2.4 69.0 5.6
Total 229 347 96 35 37 745
30.7 47.0 12.9 4.7 4.7 100
Subsample: Number of search channels activated . 1
First channel Hiring channel
Informal Advertisement LEO TPO Others Total
Informal 63 76 20 4 4 167
37.7 45.5 12.0 2.4 2.4 46.3
Advertisement 17 60 2 2 2 83
20.5 72.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 23.0
LEO 16 32 19 7 2 76
21.0 42.1 25.0 9.2 2.6 21.0
TPO 1 5 – 8 – 14
7.1 35.7 – 57.1 – 3.9
Others 5 6 1 1 8 21
23.8 28.6 4.8 4.8 38.1 5.8
Total 102 179 42 22 16 361
28.3 49.6 11.6 6.1 4.4 100
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vertisement than firms that consider low costs an unimportant ~Cost 5 1! charac-
teristic of the recruitment process ~see also Russo et al. ~1997a!!.
4 THE ECONOMETRIC MODELS USED
To empirically model the number of search channels used in recruitment, we will
use an ordered regression model ~a variant of an ordered response model!. The
number of search channels activated and the reservation productivity are directly
linked to the importance of the vacant position for the firm. The higher the cost
of a mistake in recruitment, the more careful the firm will recruit. At the begin-
ning of the recruitment procedure, employers activate the optimal combination of
search channels. The total number of different search channels activated ~SC ~T!!
then results from the repeated solution of the optimization problem sketched in
section 2. In a reduced-form approach, one can postulate that the number of
search channels activated is the observable realization of an unobservable latent
variable Y that reflects the optimal search investment, and that is influenced by
TABLE 3 – FIRMS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS RECRUITMENT AND THE NUMBER AND TYPE
OF SEARCH CHANNELS ACTIVATED
Average
number of
channels
used
Average
duration
~weeks!
First channel activated
Informal Advert. LEO TPO Others
1 1.9 6.0 211 191 92 18 29
Effort
0 1.7 4.0 83 60 38 10 13
1 1.9 6.2 170 177 80 18 23
Cost
0 1.8 4.2 124 74 50 10 19
1 1.9 5.5 279 244 123 27 42
Motivation
0 1.5 4.0 15 7 7 1 0
1 1.8 5.0 206 193 103 21 26
Fast
0 1.9 6.9 88 58 27 7 16
1 1.9 5.8 268 244 112 25 39
Right
0 1.8 2.0 26 7 18 3 3
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the value of the vacancy. The higher this value the higher the search activity at
both the intensive and extensive margins ~Mortensen ~1986!! and the more search
channels are activated. Next, the latent variable Y can be thought of as a function
of exogenous variables:
Y 5 Y ~X! 1 e ~2!
where X is the set of explanatory variables ~vacancy and firm characteristics!,
and e is the error term. In case we adopt a linear expression for Y, equation ~2!
becomes:
Y 5 X8b 1 e , e , N ~0, s2! ~3!
where b is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Moreover, we assume that e is
distributed according to a normal distribution. Y is unobserved, but for each firm
we can observe the limited dependent variable SC ~T! which is related to Y. In
our case we will follow Rietveld and Gorter ~1990!,14 so that:
SC ~T! # 1 if Y , 1.5
SC ~T! 5 2 if 1.5 # Y , 2.5
SC ~T! 5 3 if 2.5 # Y , 3.5
SC ~T! 5 4 if 3.5 # Y , 4.5
SC ~T! $ 5 if 4.5 # Y .
~4!
The corresponding likelihood function ~L! reads as follows:
L 5 )
SC ~T! # 1
F S1.5 2 xbs D p )SC ~T! 5 2 FF S2.5 2 xbs D2 F S1.5 2 xbs DG p
)
SC ~T! 5 3
FF S3.5 2 xbs D2 F S2.5 2 xbs DG p
)
SC ~T! 5 4
FF S4.52xbs D2F S3.5 2 xbs DG p
)
SC ~T! $ 5
F1 2 F S4.5 2 xbs DG ~5!
14 Note that this model collapses into a 2-limit probit model as described in Maddala ~1985! when
we would take the values between 1 and 5 as one single category.
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This model is closely linked to an ordered probit model ~Maddala ~1985!!. It is a
very general model since it does not impose a structure on the timing of the
opening of additional search channels. On the other hand, our data strongly sug-
gest that search channels are activated sequentially. Information on the timing of
the activation of auxiliary search channels is available only for those firms that
filled the vacancy via a search channel that is different from the first search chan-
nel activated ~200 observations, 53% of the firms using more than one search
channel!. Of these firms, 97% reported a positive duration between the time of
activation of the first search channel and the time of activation of the search chan-
nel that would eventually become the hiring channel.
To analyze the activation of additional search channels over time we have es-
timated a Poisson model. The Poisson model is a model to count random events
that occur independently in any fixed time interval. It gives the probability that n
events occur in the time interval of length t ~Cameron and Trivedi ~1998!!. Every
time a search channel is activated, we will observe an arrival. The basic Poisson
probability specification is:
pr ~n! 5 e 2 l
ln
n!
~6!
where n is the number of occurrences, and l is the parameter of the process. In
our case, n is the number of additional search channels used by the employers
while seeking for new employees ~the number of different recruitment channels
activated minus one, SC ~T!! 2 1!. The model exhibits the well known limitation
that the mean and the variance of the distribution are equal. In the present paper
we will adopt a generalization of the Poisson process that will allow the param-
eter l to depend on time ~see Gorter ~1991!, van Ours and Ridder ~1992!, and
Lancaster ~1992!!. This approach has been chosen, since the observation interval
is not fixed. In fact, for each firm we observe the number of channels opened
during a time period corresponding to the vacancy duration. The general expres-
sion for the probability of n arrivals within time T ~the vacancy duration! is given
in equation ~7!.
pr ~nT! 5
~ E
0
T
l ~t!dt!n
n!
e 2 E
0
T
l ~t!dt ~7!
In the model to be estimated we will adopt the following specification for l ~t!:
l ~t! 5 exb 1 a1 d1 ~t! 1 a2 d2 ~t! 1 a3 d3 ~t! 1 a4 d4 ~t! ~T 2 3! , ~8!
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where di ~t! is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the vacancy concerned is still open
in the time interval considered ~thus di ~t! 5 1 if t . i; otherwise di ~t! 5 0!. We
will consider in our analysis four time intervals; i 5 1,2,3,4 indicates the first
week, the second week, the third week and more than three weeks, repectively.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we present the results of the estimations carried out. We begin
with the estimates concerning the ordered regression models for the total number
of search channels activated. The results are presented in Table 4. As far as firms’
attitudes towards the aspects of the recruitment process are concerned, it apprears
that employers who consider the effort in recruitment as important generally use
more search channels than employers who do not. This result may indicate that
firms considering effort an important aspect of recruitment, ceteris paribus, search
more actively and, consequently, are more likely to activate more search chan-
nels. The same pattern is also found when comparing the number of search chan-
nels activated by firms that consider applicants’ motivation as an important as-
pect of the recruitment process to those that do not. The results on the effect of
the firms’ attitudes towards aspects of the recruitment process on the number of
search channels activated are not spurious, that is, they are not mediated by the
choice of the first search channel activated. In fact, the parameters of motivation
and effort remain virtually unchanged after the inclusion of the first search chan-
nel activated among the independent variables. In addition, it appears that when a
permanent position has to be filled, fewer search channels are opened. This seems
an odd result, but it could, in fact, be due to a supply side phenomenon; perma-
nent positions usually attract more applicants, so that the rate of arrival of appli-
cants tends to remain high for a long period, thus decreasing the incentive to
activate additional search channels.
Furthermore, firms in the personal service sector appear to use fewer search
channels when compared to firms in the business service sector. This result is
partially due to the correlation with the use of the first search channel. In fact,
after the addition of the first search channel activated the effect of being in the
personal services sector decreases by about 30%, but it still remains significant.
Again this may be a supply side effect due to the increase in ~female! labour
force participation.
The choice of the first search channel is also of importance for the course of
recruitment; essentially, it appears that the initial choice of one of the highly ef-
fective search channels ~advertisement! substantially reduces the chances of ob-
serving the use of additional search channels ~confront this outcome versus the
overall rate of success shown in Table 2!.
Second, to explore the rate of activation of additional search channels we have
estimated a Poisson regression model, the dependent variable is thus the number
of additional search channels activated ~SC ~T!-1!. We started with the estimation
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TABLE 4 – ORDERED REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SEARCH
CHANNELS ACTIVATED SC ~T! ~STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES; * SIGNIFICANT
AT 5%!
Dependent variables # of search channels
used SC ~T!
# of search channels
used SC ~T!
Independent variables
constant 1.43 ~0.54!* 1.23 ~0.52!*
Firms’ attitude towards recruitment
effort 0.34 ~0.20!* 0.33 ~0.15!*
motivation 0.69 ~0.38!* 0.71 ~0.35!*
speed 2 0.13 ~0.17! 2 0.06 ~0.16!
cost 2 0.01 ~0.40! 2 0.08 ~0.14!
right 0.04 ~0.45! 0.18 ~0.26!
Vacancy characteristics
Permanent 2 0.50 ~0.19!* 2 0.37 ~0.17!*
full-time 2 0.27 ~0.22! 2 0.21 ~0.19!
Required education
high 2 0.41 ~0.38! 2 0.36 ~0.29!
second 2 0.30 ~0.33! 2 0.23 ~0.25!
low vocational 2 0.40 ~0.28! 2 0.44 ~0.23!*
Experience required
specific 0.15 ~0.16! 0.29 ~0.15!*
non-specific 2 0.08 ~0.25! 2 0.01 ~0.15!
age restriction 0.08 ~0.15! 0.14 ~0.13!
Firm’s characteristics
personnel dept. 0.26 ~0.16! 0.19 ~0.15!
large 0.33 ~0.21! 0.36 ~0.18!*
medium 2 0.14 ~0.18! 2 0.02 ~0.12!
manufacturing 2 0.08 ~0.27! 2 0.10 ~0.17!
construction 2 0.07 ~0.25! 2 0.19 ~0.19!
personal services 2 0.51 ~0.23!* 2 0.36 ~0.19!*
standard deviation ~s! 1.54 ~0.07!* 1.48 ~0.07!*
First recruitment channel
informal 2 0.08 ~0.24!
advertisement 2 0.95 ~0.25!*
LEO 0.27 ~0.26!
# of observation 745 745
Log likelihood 2 907.969 2 883.853
Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given in parentheses: required education
~primary!, size of the firm ~small!, sector of the firm ~services!, personnel department ~no
personnel department!, required experience ~no experience!, age restriction ~no age restric-
tion!, permanent position ~temporary!, full-time job ~part-time job!, first recruitment chan-
nel ~others!.
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of a Poisson model on the total sample ~not including the first search channel
activated among the explanatory variables: the pooled model!. Then the same
model has been estimated for each search channel separately, these latter results
must be interpreted as conditional on the choice of the first search channel.15 The
estimates of the effects of the explanatory variables on the rate of additional
search channels are presented in Table 5. Let us begin with the pooled model
~model 1!. As far as the variables referring to firms’ attitudes during recruitment
are concerned, it appears that firms that consider effort and applicants’ motivation
important aspects of the recruitment process have a higher probability of activat-
ing additional search channels.
Moreover, it appears that firms are less likely to open additional search chan-
nels when hiring for permanent and full-time positions, requiring high educa-
tional levels. This could again be a supply side phenomenon, good positions usu-
ally attract many applicants; consequently, the rate of arrival of applicants relative
to the search channel activated would decline very slowly. In this case the like-
lihood of considering the activation of additional search channels may drop.
The presence of a personnel department appears to increase the probability of
opening auxiliary search channels during the recruitment process ~and this is par-
ticularly true when advertisement is the first search channel activated!. This ef-
fect may be linked to the higher capability in screening and selecting personnel
departments offer, firms may be willing to receive more applicants, with different
characteristics. In this event, the likelihood of considering the activation of dif-
ferent search channels would increase.
A last remark concerns the robustness of our findings. In fact, the significant
effects in the Poisson model ~timing in the activation of search channels! corre-
spond to those found in the ordered regression model ~activation of the total num-
ber of search channels! even though the structure of the two empirical models is
quite different.
If we turn to the time pattern, there seems to be a negative time dependency;
that is, as time elapses, the chance to observe the opening of a new search chan-
nel decreases. If the vacancy remains open for more than three weeks, then it is
almost certain that no additional search channels will be opened. It seems that
active recruitment takes place at the beginning of the duration spell. In fact, a
somewhat higher chance to observe an opening is formed for the third week,
then as the duration spell becomes longer, active recruitment turns into a waiting
strategy: a passive recruitment. Search channels are activated during the first few
weeks in order to reach enough applicants, while the rest of the vacancy duration
is used to hire one of the applicants.
So far, we have not allowed for search channel specific effects; to take these
into consideration we will discuss the search channel specific models ~Models 2,
15 We also estimated ordered regression models for each search channel separately. The results are
similar to those presented in Table 5 ~available by the authors upon request!.
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TABLE 5 – EFFECTS ON THE RATE OF ACTIVATION OF ADDITIONAL SEARCH CHAN-
NELS ~l ~t!! ~STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES; * SIGNIFICANT AT 5%!
Variables Model 1
~Pooled
model!
Model 2
Informal
Model 3
Adv.
Model 4
TPO 1 Others
1 LEO
Firms’ attitude towards recruitment
effort 0.22 ~0.11!* 0.16 ~0.17! 0.21 ~0.26! 0.26 ~0.16!
motivation 0.77 ~0.29!* 0.80 ~0.44!* 0.42 ~0.64! 0.35 ~0.50!
speed 2 0.09 ~0.10! 2 0.12 ~0.14! 2 0.14 ~0.26! 0.27 ~0.18!
cost 0.08 ~0.10! 2 0.15 ~0.14! 0.28 ~0.23! 0.03 ~0.15!
right 2 0.12 ~0.20! 2 0.13 ~0.27! 1.05 ~1.06! 2 0.26 ~0.27!
Vacancy characteristics
Permanent 2 0.48 ~0.11!* 2 0.44 ~0.16!* 2 0.61 ~0.30!* 2 0.02 ~0.24!
full-time 2 0.23 ~0.12! 2 0.05 ~0.18! 0.08 ~0.30! 2 0.49 ~0.21!*
Required education
high 2 0.57 ~0.19!* 2 0.40 ~0.29! 2 1.18 ~0.46!* 2 0.41 ~0.31!
second 2 0.40 ~0.17!* 2 0.38 ~0.26! 2 0.70 ~0.35!* 2 0.29 ~0.26!
low vocational 2 0.40 ~0.15!* 2 0.40 ~0.23! 2 0.69 ~0.35!* 2 0.45 ~0.23!*
Experience required
specific 0.07 ~0.10! 0.17 ~0.15! 2 0.10 ~0.26! 0.34 ~0.17!*
non-specific 2 0.05 ~0.14! 0.14 ~0.22! 2 0.47 ~0.39! 0.27 ~0.23!
age restriction 0.01 ~0.16! 0.32 ~0.13!* 2 0.45 ~0.20!* 0.09 ~0.14!
Firm’s characteristics
personnel dept. 0.21 ~0.09!* 0.05 ~0.15! 0.65 ~0.23!* 0.24 ~0.18!
large 0.19 ~0.13! 0.38 ~0.19!* 2 0.45 ~0.31! 0.33 ~0.21!
medium 2 0.09 ~0.12! 0.21 ~0.18! 2 0.29 ~0.25! 2 0.14 ~0.18!
manufacturing 2 0.03 ~0.10! 2 0.10 ~0.17! 2 0.11 ~0.26! 0.03 ~0.20!
construction 0.07 ~0.12! 2 0.04 ~0.19! 2 0.35 ~0.32! 0.28 ~0.20!
personal services 2 0.45 ~0.12!* 2 0.20 ~0.18! 2 0.77 ~0.26!* 2 0.07 ~0.25!
Time pattern
first week 2 0.47 ~0.36! 2 0.89 ~0.56! 2 0.95 ~1.26! 2 0.62 ~0.63!
second week 2 2.85 ~1.96! 2 1.72 ~0.84!* 2 2.56 ~3.03! 2 1.04 ~0.78!
third week 2 1.11 ~0.47!* 2 2.51 ~1.65! 2 2.90 ~3.01!
more than three
weeks
2 3.46 ~0.58!* 2 3.05 ~0.74!* 2 3.28 ~1.45!*
more than two weeks 2 4.33 ~1.44!*
Log likelihood 2 897.124 2 359.518 2 222.694 2 275.828
# of observations 745 294 251 200
Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given in parentheses: required education
~primary!, size of the firm ~small!, sector of the firm ~services!, personnel department ~no
personnel department!, required experience ~no experience!, age restriction ~no age restric-
tion!, permanent position ~temporary!, full-time job ~part-time!.
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3, and 4!. We will begin with the informal channel. A very interesting result re-
lates to the size of the firm. Apparently, large firms have an incentive to open
additional search channels when the informal channel is the first search channel
activated ~Model 2!. The same holds true when there are age restrictions. The
results gain in importance when they are compared to the bahaviour of the rate
of arrival of additional search channels when advertisement is the first search
channel activated ~Model 3!. One of the first things to be noticed is the role of
educational requirements. Here they have a negative effect on the rate of arrival
of additional search channels ~note that when the informal channel is the first
recruitment channel, educational requirements are not significant!. The same is
true when there are age restrictions. The size of the firm does not appear to be
significant, but the sign of the effect is negative ~it is positive when the informal
channel is the first search channel activated!. All these observations together may
give rise to the following interpretation of how advertisement functions. Educa-
tional requirements and age restrictions have a negative effect on the chance that
a second channel is opened; this may be due to the fact that advertisement is the
recruitment channel that gives more space for the job-related information in the
initial phase of recruitment, so that potential candidates are exposed to self-se-
lection before applying for the vacant position concerned. In other words, one
may expect that self-selection among applicants is the advantage of using adver-
tisements, while the advantage of the informal channel may stem from its capac-
ity to screen candidates on the grounds of their ability. The negative sign for the
size effect ~although not significant!, may be due to the fact large firms are able
to use the hiring standards as screening devices more efficiently than smaller firms
~see Oosterbeek and van Praag ~1993!!, so that they rely on advertisement more
often.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The empirical analysis conducted in this paper highlights an important feature of
firms’ recruitment behaviour. To the extent that firms differ in their attitudes to-
wards certain aspects of the recruitment process ~heterogeneity! they will choose
different recruitment strategies. Firms will choose to activate different numbers of
search channels as empirically shown in the present paper.
The empirical analysis reveals the following empirical regularities:
Firms considering effort an important aspect of the recruitment process are, cet-
eris paribus, more likely to activate multiple search channels. This effect also
persists after controlling for the effect of the first search channel activated;
Firms considering applicants’ motivation an important aspect of recruitment
tend to activate relatively more search channels. Again, this result persists when
we control for the effect of the first search channel activated.
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These outcomes are consistent with the notion that firms searching more actively
are, ceteris paribus, more likely to use additional search channels.
To summarize our results, it appears that firms differ in the degree of impor-
tance they attach to certain aspects of the recruitment process. This form of het-
erogeneity, usually neglected in other empirical analysis because of lack of infor-
mation, has nonetheless important effects on the choice of the number of search
channels to activate during the recruitment process.
APPENDIX A1 – FIRMS’ ATTITUDE TOWARDS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE
RECRUITMENT PROCESS
The firm’s attitude towards certain aspects of the recruitment process is derived
from the evaluation of the following set of 5 statements:
1! The recruitment process should not be expensive
2! The recruitment process should not cause much work
3! The recruitment process should deliver motivated applicants
4! The recruitment process should deliver applicants quickly
5! The recruitment process should deliver the right applicants
Employers could agree or disagree with each of these statements. From these
statements we generated the following five dummy variables:
Cost: equal to 1 if the employer disagrees with statement 1, and zero otherwise;
Effort: equal to 1 if the employer disagrees with statement 2, and zero otherwise;
Motivation: equal to 1 if the employer agrees with statement 3, and zero other-
wise;
Fast: equal to 1 if the employer agrees with statement 4, and zero otherwise;
Right: equal to 1 if the employer agrees with statement 5, and zero otherwise.
The set of five statements was placed at the very beginning of the interview and
employers had no way of knowing that the following questions would address
the last vacancy filled. Consequently, it could happen that employers disagreeing
with statement 2 did not put much effort in the recruitment process for their last
vacancy filled because the vacancy had been really easy to fill.
In Table A1 the correlation coefficients between the five dummies are presented.
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TABLE A1 – CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FIRMS ATTITUDES TOWARDS RE-
CRUITMENT ~*: SIGNIFICANT AT 5%!
Effort Motivation Fast Cost Right
Effort 1
Motivation 2 0.06 1
Fast 2 0.20* 0.23 1
Cost 0.32* 2 0.12* 2 0.22* 1
Right 0.04 0.17* 0.09* 2 0.01 1
APPENDIX A2 – LIST OF VARIABLES
Duration: duration of the recruitment process, in days.
Lndur: logarithm of duration.
TRC: number of search channels activated.
Effort: see Appendix A1.
Motivation: see Appendix A1.
Cost: see Appendix A1.
Fast: see Appendix A1.
Right: see Appendix A1.
Pers. dept.: dummy variable 5 1 if a firm has a personnel department.
Large: dummy variable 5 1 if a firm has more than 100 employees.
Medium: dummy variable 5 1 if a firm has more than 10 and less than 100 em-
ployees.
Small: dummy variable 5 1 if a firm has less than 50 employees.
Manufacturing: dummy variable 5 1 if firms operate in one of the following in-
dustries: Agriculture @ISIC 1#, Mining @ISIC 2#, Manufacturing @ISIC 3#, Utilities
@ISIC 4#.
Services: dummy variable 5 1 if firms operate in one of the following industries:
Business services ~Finance and insurance and real estate and business services!
@ISIC 8#, Restaurant and hotels and trade @ISIC 6#, Transport and communication
@ISIC 7#.
Personal services: dummy variable 5 1 if firms operate in the following industry:
Community and social and personal services @ISIC 9#.
Construction: dummy variable 5 1 if firms operate in the following industry: Con-
struction @ISIC 5#.
Primary: dummy variable 5 1 if Minimal educational level required is primary
education.
Low vocational: dummy variable 5 1 if Minimal educational level required is sec-
ondary vocational.
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Second: dummy variable 5 1 if Minimal educational level required is secondary
general.
High: dummy variable 5 1 if Minimal educational level required is university of
comparable vocational level.
No-experience: dummy variable 5 1 if no working experience is required.
Specific: dummy variable 5 1 if specific working experience is required.
Non-specific: dummy variable 5 1 if non-specific working experience is required.
Age restriction: dummy variable 5 1 if an age limit is imposed.
Full-time: dummy variable 5 1 if hiring concerns a full-time position ~more than
30 hours per week!.
Permanent: dummy variable 5 1 if the vacancy concerns a permanent position.
APPENDIX A3 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Duration 5.48 6.62
Lndur 1.28 0.89
TRC 1.84 1.09
Effort 0.73 0.45
Motivation 0.96 0.20
Fast 0.74 0.44
Cost 0.37 0.48
Right 0.92 0.27
Pers. dept. 0.45 0.50
No-exp. 0.28 0.45
Specific 0.58 0.49
Non-spec. 0.13 0.34
Permanent 0.84 0.37
Full-time 0.84 0.37
Age restriction 0.51 0.50
Primary 0.09 0.29
Low vocational 0.45 0.50
Second 0.31 0.46
High 0.16 0.36
Medium 0.39 0.49
Large 0.33 0.47
Small 0.28 0.45
Manufacture 0.23 0.42
Construction 0.21 0.41
Pers. serv. 0.27 0.44
Services 0.30 0.46
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